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THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE UNDER FOREIGN LAW
A. Canada
G. ARTHUR MARTIN*
In Canada, the general rule is that evidence
otherwise admissible is not rendered inadmissible
by the fact that it was illegally obtained. This
statement is, however, subject to the rules re-
specting the admissibility of confessions. Articles
seized under an illegal search warrant or obtained
,by a trespass are admissible,1 and evidence ob-
tained by an illegal search of the person is also
admissible.
In Kuruma v. The Queen, Lord Goddard, speak-
ing for the Judicial Committeeof the Privy Council,
said:
"In their Lordships' opinion the test to be
applied in considering whether evidence is
admissible is whether it is relevant to the matters
in issue. If it is, it is admissible and the court
is not concerned with how the evidence was
obtained."1
In A.G. of Quebec v. Begin,3 the accused was
convicted of motor manslaughter. Section 285
(4d) of the Code (now sec. 224 (3)) provided that,
on charges of driving a motor vehicle while intoxi-
cated or while impaired by alcohol or a drug, the
result of a chemical analysis of the blood, urine,
breath or other bodily substance of a person may
be admitted in evidence on the issue of whether
that person was intoxicated or under the influence
of a narcotic drug or whether his ability to drive
was impaired by alcohol or a drug, notwithstand-
ing that he was not, before he gave the sample,
warned that he need not give the sample or that
the results of the sample might be used in evidence.
No warning was given to the accused, and it was
argued that since the charge was not one of those
referred to in the section, but one of manslaughter,
a warning was required to render the result of the
analysis of the accused's blood admissible. The
Supreme Court held that no warning was neces-
* Member of the Bars of British Columbia and On-
tario with offices in Toronto. Additional biographical
data may be found in 51 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 161
(1960).-EDrTOP.
I R. v. Lee Hai, 64 Can. C.C. 49 (1935); R. v. Honan,
20 Can. C.C. 10 (1912); R. v. Doyle, 12 O.R. 347
(1886).
2[1955] 2 W.L.R. 223, 226-27.
' 112 Can. C.C. 209 (1955).
sary. The accused had in fact consented to the
giving of the blood sample; the court stated,
however, that the evidence of the analysis would
have been admissible even if the sample had been
taken without his consent, although section 285
(4e) (now sec. 224(4)) provided that no person
was required to give such a sample.
In a subsequent case4 the court dearly limited
the confession rule to self-criminating statements
and held that it did not embrace "the incriminating
conditions of the body, features, fingerprints,
clothing, or behaviour of the accused, that persons,
other than himself, observe or detect and ulti-
mately report as witnesses in judicial pro-
ceedings." 5
In Kuruma v. The Queen, the Judicial Committee
of the Privy Council indicated that the court had
a discretion to exclude evidence which had been
obtained by improper means if its admission would
operate unfairly against the accused. Lord God-
dard, speaking for the Judicial Committee of the
Privy Council, said:
"No doubt in a criminal case the judge always
has a discretion to disallow evidence if the strict
rules of admissibility would operate unfairly
against an.accused. This was emphasized in the
case before this Board of Noor Mohamed v. The
King, [19491 A.C. 182, and in the recent case
in the House of Lords, Harris v. Director of
Public Prosecutions, [19521 A.C. 694. If, for
instance, some admission of some piece of paper,
e.g. a document, had been obtained from a de-
fendant by a trick, no doubt the judge might
properly rule it out."
' 6
It is to be noted that the principle laid down in
Noor Mohamed v. The King and Harris v. Director
'Reference under the Constitutional Questions Act
re section 92(4) of The Vehicles Act, 1957 (Sask.) c. 93,
121 Can. C.C. 321 (1958).
6 Per Fauteux, J., id. at 331. Cf. R. v. Barker, [1941]
2 K.B. 381, 28 C.A.R. 52, where the English Court of
Criminal Appeal held that books and records produced
by the accused to government investigators under a
promise of immunity from prosecution stood on the
same footing as any oral or written confession.
6[1955] 2 W.L.R. 223, 227.
7 [1949] A.C. 182.
GLANVILLE L. WILLIAMS
of Public Prosecutions" was an entirely different
one, namely, that the trial judge has a discretion
to exclude evidence of trifling weight having regard
to the purpose for which it is professedly offered
if its admission would unfairly prejudice the pris-
oner. The suggestion in the case of Kuruma v. The
Queen that a court may in the exercise of its dis-
cretion exclude evidence of physical things dis-
covered by unfair means is somewhat novel and
runs counter to the long line of authorities holding
that facts discovered as a result of a confession
obtained by improper means are admissible.9
Indeed it was recently held in Ontario that as
much of an illegally obtained confession as is
confirmed by facts discovered as a result of the
confession may be admitted. 10 It is true that Lord
8[1952] A.C. 694.
9 R. v. Warickshall, 1 Leach 263 (1783); R. v. Gould,
9 C. & P. 364 (1840); R. v. White, 15 Can. C.C. 30
(1908).
10 R. v. St. Lawrence, 93 Can. C.C. 376 (1949).
Goddard did not purport to be dealing with
material things obtained by illegal seizure, but
instead with things obtained by a trick; still, it is
difficult to see why the same principle should not
apply in both cases.
If the courts consider that they have a discre-
tion to exclude illegally obtained evidence, they
do not appear to have exercised that discretion in
favour of the accused. The problem of deliberate
violation of the rights of the citizen by the police
in their efforts to obtain evidence has not been as
pressing in Canada as in some other countries.
In the absece of constitutional restrictions, the
powers of the police can be enlarged by legislation
when required to cope with some particularly
serious problem of law enforcement. In addition,
the remedy in tort has proved reasonably effective;
Canadian juries are quick to resent illegal activity
on the part of the police and to express that re-




THE ENGLISH VIEw: REJECrION
OF THE EXCLUSIONARY Rury,
Under the prevailing English rule, the fact
that evidence is obtained through a trespass or
other illegal search or seizure does not exclude it
from evidence. This rule was accepted during the
nineteenth century in two cases of a somewhat
low order of authority. In Derrington,l the prisoner
gave a letter to the turnkey, who promised to post
it, but who instead gave it to the prosecutor. The
letter was received in evidence. In Jones v. Owens,'
2
a constable illegally searched the defendant and
found twenty-five young salmon in his pocket;
it was held that the evidence was admissible on a
charge of illegal fishing. Mellor, J., said: "I think
it would be a dangerous obstacle to the adminis-
tration of justice if we were to hold, because evi-
dence was obtained by illegal means, it could not
be used against a party charged with an offence."
The issue lay dormant in the criminal courts
* Reader in English Law in the University of Cam-
bridge and a Fellow of Jesus College, Cambridge. Addi-
tional biographical data may be found in 51 J. CaLm.
L., C. & P.S. 166 (1960).-EDrrOR.
12 C.&P. 418, 172 E.R. 189 (1826).
2 34 J.P. 759 (1870).
until it was revived before the Pivy Council in
Kuruma in 1955.3 The defendant had been con-
victed of being in unlawful possession of am-
munition, evidence having been given by police
officers that they had searched him and found the
ammuinition on him. It was alleged for the defence
that this search was unlawful. The Privy Council
refused to allow an appeal against conviction,
holding that even if the search was illegal, the
evidence obtained by it did not become inadmis-
sible. The judgment was delivered by Lord God-
dard, C. J., who laid it down that the test to be
applied in considering whether evidence is admis-
sible is whether it is relevant to matters in issue.
If it is, it is admissible, and the court is not con-
cerned with how the evidence was obtained. How-
ever, the learned Chief Justice qualified this by
saying: "No doubt in a criminal case the judge
always has a discretion to disallow evidence if the
strict rules of admissibility would operate unfairly
against the accused.... If, for instance, some
admission of some piece of evidence, e.g. a docu-
ment, had been obtained from a defendant by a
trick, no doubt the judge might properly rule it
3 [1955] A.C. 197.
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out." It is not easy to see why evidence obtained
by trickery should be ruled out, when evidence
obtained by unlawful force is not; the latter would
seem to be a more flagrant breach of the law than
the former.
Lord Goddard went on to say: "It should be
stated that the rule with regard to the admission
of confessions [i.e., the rule excluding induced
confessions], whether it be regarded as an excep-
tion to the general rule [i.e., the rule that relevant
evidence is admissible] or not, is a rule of law which
their Lordships are not qualifying in any degree
whatsoever." This statement is satisfactory as
far as it goes, -but one would like to know the
reason for not applying the general rule of ad-
missibility to the special case of induced confes-
sions. There must be some reason why an induced
confession is excluded, though relevant, while
evidence obtained by an illegal search is admitted.
Some consideration other than that of relevancy
must create this distinction. It would have been
more satisfactory if we had been told what the
consideration is. In the absence of an explanation,
one does not know whether English law is fun-
damentally consistent with itself. For example,
one possible reason for excluding induced con-
fessions is that this is necessary in order to hold
the police and prosecution to proper behaviour.
But this reason would equally suggest the exclusion
of evidence obtained by an illegal search.
There are other grounds for dissatisfaction with
the decision in Kuruma. The American decisions
which hold the contrary were not properly con-
sidered, and their basis was .quite possibly mis-
understood. Similarly the Scottish decisions, which
are also to the contrary, were misinterpreted and
misstated.' Since decisions of the Privy Council
are not absolutely binding in future cases, even
upon the Privy Council itself, this important
question of public policy cannot be regarded as
finally settled.
There are a few civil cases bearing on the issue.
In Calcrafl v. Guest,5 the defendant came into
posssession of certain of the plaintiff's documents
which the defendant could not produce in evidence
because they were privileged. The defendant
4 See the powerful criticism of Kuruma by Prof.
Franck in 33 CA. B. REv. 721, and subsequent corre-
spondence in id. at 984, 1111. See also CowEN &
CARTER, EssAYs ON TRE LAw OF EvrwENcF c. 2 (Oxford
1956).
s [1898] 1 Q.B. 759 (C.A.). CompareLloydv. Mostyn,
10 M. & W. 478, 152 E.R. 558 (1842).
returned the documents to the plaintiff, but not
before he had made copies of them. It was held
that the defendant could give secondary evidence
of the contents of the documents. The court as-
sumed that the way in which the defendant got
his evidence was of no interest to justice, and it
seems to have assumed that the evidence would
have been admissible even if it had been stolen
from theother side. The decision is anextraordinary
one, for there can be little point in conferring
privilege upon original documents if pirated copies
of them are admissible.
In Lord Ashburlon v. Pape,6 a way was found to
avoid this consequence. Pape was a bankrupt,
whose discharge was opposed by the plaintiff. Pape,
by a trick, obtained privileged letters written by
the plaintiff to his solicitor. Pape had these letters
copied and proposed to use them in the bank-
ruptcy proceedings as secondary evidence of their
contents. The plaintiff sought an injunction
against Pape to restrain him from disclosing the
letters or their copies. The injunction was granted.
This outcome is satisfactory; however, it is vexa-
tious to require separate proceedings to be brought
in such circumstances, particularly against an
undischarged bankrupt who will be unable to
contribute to the costs. If a court of equity will
enjoin the use of such documents, it would seem
to follow under the Judicature Act that the view
of equity should prevail in all courts; separate
proceedings should not be required to give effect
to it.
Yet even if this is so, there are difficulties in
applying the rule in Lord Ashburton v. Pape to
criminal proceedings. If the defendant to a crimi-
nal charge appealed to equity to suppress illegally
obtained documentary evidence of his guilt, equity
would quite possibly refuse to assist him. In any
case, the rule in Lord Ashburton v. Pape can apply
only. to documentary evidence the use of which
would be a breach of what may be called the ac-
cused's equitable copyright; the rule would not
suppress evidence concerning other types of in-
criminating articles.
RuLEs OF O=R COMMON LAW JURISDiCriONS
Other common law jurisdictions have almost
invariably followed the traditional view and
admitted evidence illegally obtained. Canada, as
indicated by Mr. Martin in the preceding article,
6 [1913] 2 Ch. 469 (C.A.).
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follows this approach. Another example is Ceylon.-
Irish courts seem to have undergone a change
of attitude. In an 1887 case, evidence was admitted
although illegally obtained, but in 1955 a judge
refused to admit evidence of fingerprints that had
been taken with the consent of the accused when
he was in custody on a different charge, since he
had not been told of his right to refuse consent.9
The Scottish courts recognise that there are two
important interests that are liable to come into
conflict, (a) the interest of the citizen to be pro-
tected from illegal invasions of his liberty by the
authorities, and (b) the interest of the state to
ensure that evidence bearing upon the commission
of crime and necessary to enable justice to be done
shall not be withheld from courts of law on any
merely formal or technical ground. Neither of
these objects, said Lord Justice-General Cooper
in Lawrie v. Muir,10 can be insisted upon to the
uttermost, and the judge has a discretion to admit
or exclude the evidence. "Irregularities require
to be excused, and infringements of the formalities
of the law are not lightly to be condoned." One
question to ask is whether the departure from
strict procedure has been adopted deliberately
and by way of trick. Another is whether Parliament
has prescribed a special procedure, departure from
which is likely to be regarded as fatal.
The facts of Lawrie v. Muir were that the keeper
of a dairy was convicted of violating a statutory
order by selling her milk in bottles belonging to
other persons. The evidence against her consisted
of testimony by two inspectors of a limited com-
pany formed for the purpose of restoring milk
bottles to their rightful owners. The inspectors
had no right to enter the defendant's premises,
because she had not contracted with the Milk
Marketing Board; it was only the Board's con-
tracts that gave the inspectors a right *of entry.
However, the defendant permitted the inspectors,
who produced their warrants, to make a full in-
spection. It was held by a Full Bench of the High
Court of Justiciary that the inspectors, though
acting in good faith, had illegally entered the
premises by misrepresentation, and that their
evidence was inadmissible; a conviction was
accordingly quashed. The reason why the court
.exercised its discretion to rule out the evidence
7 Rajapakse v. Fernando, 52 N.R.L. 361 (1951); see
[1955] Clm. L. REv. 328.
8 Dillon v. O'Brien, L. R. Ir. 300, 16 Cox C. C. 245
(1887).
People v. Lawlor, [1955-6] Ir. Jur. Rep. 38, 21
J. Crim. L. (Eng.) 263 (1957).
10 [1950] Just. Cas. 19.
was that the inspectors had only narrow powers,
the limits of which they ought to know. The
decision is all the more striking to an English
lawyer because he would not regard the inspectors'
entry, made with the defendant's consent, as
wrongful. The misrepresentation as to the right
to enter would not vitiate the consent in English
law. However, it is an intelligible view that the
entry, though not tortious, was sufficiently wrong-
ful to exclude the evidence that came to light as a
result of it.
In a later case, Fairley v. Fishmongers of Lon-
don,n the inspector's departure from the strict
procedure was a very narrow one. He was author-
ised to search for evidence relating to the contra-
vention of food regulations and of an order dealing
with salmon, but not concerning the Salmon
Fisheries Act, under which the prosecution was
taken. In the circumstances the court allowed the
evidence to be given.
In TurnbuW' a search was made upon the de-
fendant's premises under warrant, but documents
were taken which were not within the scope of the
warrant. Lord Guthrie refused to admit the
documents in evidence, because in the circum-
stances a contrary ruling would tend not only to
nullify the protection afforded to a citizen by the
requirement of a magistrate's warrant," but also to
offer a positive inducement to the authorities to
proceed by irregular methods. Lord Guthrie
pointed out that there were no circumstances of
urgency at the time of the seizure; nor were the
documents taken plainly incriminating on their
face. In Kuruma, Lord Goddard referred to this
ruling with apparent approval;13 but he did not
explain why evidence obtained by trespass to
property is more objectionable, or more unfair to
the accused, than evidence obtained by an assault
upon the person.
Perhaps the most important of these Scottish
cases is McGovern.4 Here the police illegally took
scrapings from the fingernails of a person who was
at the police station under suspicion. Since this
action was taken without his consent, it amounted,
to an assault. The court excluded the evidence of
the scrapings. Lord Justice-General Cooper again
laid down the principle upon which the Scottish
courts act: "Irregularities of this kind always need
to be 'excused' or condoned, if they can be excused
1 [1951] Just. Cas. 14.
12 [1951] Just. Cas. 96.
13 [1955] A.C. 197, 204.
14 [1950] Just. Cas. 33.
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or condoned, whether by the existence of urgency,
the relative triviality of the irregularity, or other
circumstances. This is not a case where I feel
disposed to. 'excuse' the conduct of the police."
This important decision was directly in point on
the facts of Kuruma, because it involved a tres-
pass to the person; it was not cited, however, in
the judgment in Kuruma, which is misleading on
the Scottish doctrine.
The latest in the series of Scottish cases is
Marsh v. Johnston,15 where policemen bought
liquor out of hours in order to obtain evidence of
an illegal sale. It was held that their evidence was
admissible. The purchase, although technically an
offence by the police themselves, was not a wrong
as to the defendants.
.15 [1959] CfaM. L. REv. 444 (H.C. of Justiciary).
C. France
ROBERT VOUIN*
In French criminal law, the fundamental rule
concerning the burden of proof is the principle of
presumption of innocence: it rests with the pros-
ecution to present the proof, and any accused
person is deemed innocent as long as his culpability
has not been proved by the prosecution.
The second rule, concerning the administration
of the proof, is what we call the principle of the
deep-seated conviction. As the instruction used
for the jury of the Assize Court says:
"The law does not call upon the jurymen to
account for the means through which they let
themselves be persuaded, it does not lay down
rules upon which they must particularly make
the completeness and adequacy of a proof de-
pend; it prescribes to them to interrogate them-
selves in silence and meditation, and to tryto find,
in the sincerity of their own conscience, what
impression was made on their reason by the
proofs reported against the accused and the
means of his defence. This is the only question
stated by the law, a question which encloses
the whole measure of their duties: Do you have
a deep-seated c',nviction?"'
Two consequences proceed from this principle
of the deep-seated conviction. On the one hand,
with certain exceptions stated by law, the proof
may be made by any means. But on the other
hand any proof, with certain exceptions, is depend-
ent upon the judge's deep-seated conviction. All
proofs can be received in France in a criminal trial,
because any proof appreciated by the judge accord-
ing to his deep-seated conviction is never conclu-
sive in itself. So it is, for example, that the admis-
* Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of
Paris. Additional biographical data may be found in 51
J. Cmu. L., C. & P.S. 169 (1960).-EUrroR.
I CODE OF PENAL PROcEDuRE, art. 353.
sibility of hearsay evidence can be explained, this
evidence which is so disgraceful in the eyes of the
common law jurist.
Another rule, however, restricts the ability to
prove by any means. Proofs are admissible in the
criminal trial only if they have been legally secured
and legally adduced. If the French law accepts
all modes of proofs, it emphasizes, nevertheless,
the way to proceed to get the proof, with the
result that any proof illegally obtained must be
dismissed from the judiciary proceedings. The
principle of the legality of the proof should be
comprehended not in view of the nature of the
proof, but of the means used to obtain it. The
proof must be legal, in France, in the sense that
the judge can build his deep-seated conviction
only on proofs obtained and introduced according
to the law.
It is from this principle that the rules proceed
concerning house searches, illegal seizures, and
confessions obtained through illegal means or
following an illegal search.
The invalidity of a house-search made without
a search warrant from a judge does not annul the
sentence which has followed, if the judgement of
sentence makes it explicit that the illegal house-
search has not been taken into account.2 However,
a sentence must be annuled if it has been deliv-
ered exclusively on the basis of an official report
which is null and void for having resulted
from an illegal house search.
3
It is clear though that a search carried out
without a warrant is legal if it is carried out with
the consent of the master of the house. In this case,
as a matter of fact, there is no violation of the
2 Cass. Crim., Bull. Crim. No. 394 (1924).
3Cass. Crim., Rec. de Dr. Penal 231 (1948).
19611
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privacy of a person's house. The principle of the
inviolacy of a person's house, described by art. 76,
still in force, of the constitution of 22 Frimaire
VIIth year, must be then considered as respected.
But the concerned person's consent can validate
the search carried out without a warrant only if
the consent is given "with full knowledge of the
facts, that is to say with the knowledge that the
proceeding is illegal." The consent can validate
the search only if it is given by a person who
knows he has a right to refuse the search. The
Supreme Court of Appeal rescinds all sentences
based upon searches carried out without a war-
rant, if the sentences do, not include the acknow-
ledgement of a consent given "with full knowledge
of the facts."4
The man on the street, the average Frenchman,
is not always fully aware of the exact measure of
his rights, and if he is guilty is apt to confess his
culpability as the result of a search, even if the
search is illegal.
The invalidity of a search does not necessarily
lead to the invalidity of a procedure started or
carried on thereafter. 5 The judge, as a generalrule,
must estimate the probative value of the prelimi-
nary investigation writs which will have followed.
But what about a -confession resulting from an
illegal procedure?
In 1935, in the Boutros case, the "Chambre
Criminelle" quashed a verdict of not guilty, judg-
ing that the nullity of search or seizure procedures
"did not forbid the judge to take into consideration
all the factors of the proof independently of illegal
deeds; and particularly the accused's later confes-
sions, if they could be regarded as made without
restraint, could not be considered as non-existent,
on the sole ground they had followed an illegal
house search.
' 6
However, in 1953, in the Isnard case, the same
jurisdiction quashed a verdict of conviction for the
reason that the "proceeding concerning Isnard...
reported altogether his arrest, his search and his
statements; that the operations the police had
carried out made a whole; that the confessions
the judges of the Court of Appeal took into account
could have been valid only if they had been made
freely; that in the case in point, it was not so,
ICass. Crim., Rec. Dalloz 1924.1.174 (1923); id.,
Rec. Dalloz 1936.1.46 (1936); id. Rec. Dalloz 1954.110
(1953).
1 Cass. Crim., Rec. Sirey 1937.1.73, note L. Hugue-
ney (1936).
6 Cass. Crim., Rec. Dalloz 1936.1.20, not minin.
(1935).
considering the circumstances in which they had
been obtained."
'7
These two judgments dealt with the same
problem; the second one was careful to equate the
"search of a person" with a house-search. But
though one quashed a verdict of conviction and
the other a verdict of not guilty, there is no con-
tradiction between them. The Boutros judgment
had laid upon the judges the obligation to find
whether the confession consequent upon the illegal
house-search might still have been free, and con-
sequently admittable as proof. The Isnard judge-
ment only added the affirmation of the right of
supervision that the Supreme Court of Appeal
grants itself upon the judges' official investigations,
and from which it would procceed that a confession
resulting from an illegal search might or might
not have been free.
It may happen that confessions obtained by
trickery or guile cannot be accepted in the prelimi-
nary judicial inquiry. The Supreme Court of Appeal
declares, in the same way, that confessions which
have been illegally obtained cannot be used as
proofs.
In 1888, the examining magistrate in charge of
the Wilson case ventured to call on the phone a
person whom he suspected of complicity, passing
himself off as another person also suspected. This
magistrate was censured by the Supreme Court of
the Magistrature on January 31, 1888.8
In 1949 in the Imbert case, a police superintend-
ent arranged a telephone conversation between
two suspected persons and overheard it from
another receiver. The sentence later pronounced
was quashed by the "Chambre Criminelle" of the
Supreme Court of Appeal on the ground that the
police officer's intervention "had as an aim and a
result to elude the legal dispositions and the general
rules of procedure that the examining magistrate
or his delegate should not fail to recognize without
jeopardizing the rights of the Defence." This
judgment is very important, because it states that
the violation of the rights of the defence, even
outside any violation of a written law, may lead
to the annulment of the procedureY
A short time later, another police superinten-
7 Cass. Crim., Rec. Dalloz 1953.533, note Lapp
(1953); cf., Vouin, Illegally Obtained Evidence, INTL.
CRIM. POLICE REV. 241 (No. 91 1955).
8 Rec. Sirey 1889.1.242; cf., Rousselet, REV. D. SCI-
ENCE CRIMINELLE 50 (1946).
9Cass. Crim., Sem. Jurid. 1952.11.7241, note J.
Brouchot (1952); cf., Vouin, CRrm. L. REV. 10 (1955).
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dent, in the Jolivol case," in order to identify the
guilty person, had a recorder plugged into the
receiver of the telephone of a couple who had com-
plained of being insulted regularly over the tele-
phone. The "Chambre Civile" of the Supreme
Court of Appeal decided that the plaintiffs civil
rights were violated by the installing of this re-
corder set, with the couple's consent, to detect the
telephone call.
This decision has not been approved by every-
body and is questionable law. But it dearly
10 Cass. Civ., Gaz. Palais 1955.1.249 (2d sec. 1955).
demonstrates the will of the Supreme Court of
Appeal to disapprove, in the civil as well as penal
law, police methods which might allow some per-
sons to come upon confessions dishonestly.
As a conclusion, it is well established in the
French penal law, without reference to the con-
stitutional law or public liberties, that the convic-
tion of a suspected or accused person cannot be
based upon an illegal proof, because any proof
illegally or irregularly obtained must be dismissed
from the proceedings in court.
This solution guarantees the rights of the defence
and the protection of all citizens.
D. Germany
WALTER R. CLEMENS*
In the German law of procedure, the "rule of
free evaluation of evidence" as laid down in section
261 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (hereinafter
called CCP) prevails. This provision reads: "The
Court shall evaluate the evidence according to
its unlimited estimation and with due regard to
the general course of the trial." Section 261 is
dosely related to Section 244(ii), CCP, which
reads: "The Court shall ex officio expand the
taking of the evidence to all facts and evidence
relevant to the exploration of the truth." Such
evidence includes that which has been obtained
by the police.
Hence the principle of free evaluation of evidence
permits the judge, and binds him at the same time,
freely to weigh the evidence without any ties to
strict rules. Thus, for instance, he may not be
satisfied with the sworn statements of one or more
police officers and instead credit the conflicting
statement of the defendant. He may, on the other
hand, disbelieve the defendant's confession if he
has reasonable grounds to assume the defendant
made it only to protect another person. He may
also refrain from using evidence which appears
dubious for other reasons, or which was obtained
in a dubious way.
To some extent, however, the judge's right to
an unlimited evaluation of evidence is curtailed
by the law. In certain cases it prohibits the judge,
expressly or by interpretation, from using certain
Head Officer, Ministry of Justice, State of Ham-
burg, Germany. Additional biographical data may be
found in 51 J. CRat. L., C. & P.S. 172 (1960).-ErrOR.
evidence, especially evidence obtained in violation
of legal commands or bans. But in the vast
majority of cases the use of such evidence is
admissible in principle.
Although it is the primary objective of this
report to discuss the exclusion of illegally seized
physical evidence, it appears advisable to extend
the discussion to evidence other than physical,
since only thus can the German system of the
exclusionary rule be dearly represented.
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE THE USE
OF WHICH IS PROHIBITED
(1) The most unambiguous prohibition against
the use of illegally obtained evidence is laid down in
Section 136a, CCP.' It prohibits certain immoral
methods of interrogation and says that statements
of the defendant obtained in violation of this
provision shall not be used in evidence, regardless
of his consent.
(2) Section 69(iii), CCP, provides that Section
136a, CCP, is applicable to the hearing of wit-
nesses. Therefore, the judge is prohibited from us-
ing a witness's testimony obtained in violation
of Section 136a, CCP.
(3) Section 252, CCP, says: "The statement of a
witness heard prior to the trial who only in court
takes advantage of his right to refuse to give
evidence, shall not be read out." This provision
1 Regarding the text of this provision and further
details, see Clemens, Police Interrogation Privileges and
Limitations (Germany), 52 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 59
(1961).
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has been extensively interpreted by the courts and
law professors to go far beyond its wording. It is
regarded as a far-reaching ban on the use of evi-
dence. The extent of this ban is a matter of
argument.
Following the generally accepted opinion of the
courts2 and law teachers, 3 Section 252, which is
considered to be supplementary to the provisions of
the CCP regarding the privilege of the witness to
refuse his testimony, prohibits the judge from using
statements made by such witnesses as have taken
advantage of their privilege only subsequent to
their interrogation.
The privilege of silence is granted by the CCP
to the near relations of the defendant;4 to certain
persons who are under an obligation of secrecy,
e.g., parsons, defense counsel, lawyers, doctors,
members of the Bundestag and the Landtage,
editors, etc., and their assistants (with the restric-
tion that they have no right to refuse their testi-
mony if they were already released from their
obligation of secrecy);5 and to every witness in
regard to all questions an answer to which would
expose him or his near relations to the danger of
a criminal prosecution.'
Further, Section 252 bans the use of a statement
made by a witness who, contrary to a command
of the CCP, was not advised on his privilege of
silence prior to his interrogation. This is generally
accepted as far as regards the command to advise
the near relations of the defendant.7 There is
controversy, however, with respect to the command
to advise witnesses who by making a statement
expose themselves or near relations to the risk of a
criminal prosecution. While the Federal Supreme
Court denies a ban on the use of a statement
taken in violation of this command, prominent law
theorists9 are right in affirming such ban.
2 2 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Straf-
sachen 105 (Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court in
Criminal Matters); 7 id. 195.
'KLEINKNECHT-M1'LLER, KOMMENTAR ZUR STRAF-
PROZESSORDlNUNG (Commentary on the CCP) §48, pre-
liminary note 2e I (4th ed.); EBERHARD SCHMIDT, LEHR-
KOMMENTAR ZUR STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG (Instructional
Commentary of Criminal Procedure) pt. II, §252, n.1
(1957).
CCP, §52, para. (i).
'CCP, §§52, 53(a).
5 CCP, §55, para. (i).
7 See, e.g., KLEINKNECHT-i,LLER, op. cit. supra note
3, at §52, n.3f.
8 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Straf-
sachen 40 (Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court in
Criminal Matters).
9KLRINKNECHT-MNlLLcR, op. cit. supra note 3, at
§55, n.4; EBERHARD SCHMIDT, op. cit. supra note 3, at
§55, n.9.
Finally, Section 252, which speaks only of the
case of a genuine privilege of silence, is deemed
applicable in cases where the CCP affords a protec-
tion which is rooted in such privilege. Section 81c,
CCP, provides that persons other than the de-
fendant may refuse a bodily examination or the
taking of a blood test for the same reasons as they
may refuse their testimony. According to the
relevant court decisions0 and law teachers" the
result of such examination or blood test as was
made in spite of a refusal shall not be used in
evidence, in analogous application of Section 252,
because "the duty to tolerate the bodily examina-
tion or the blood test is kind of an extended duty
to give evidence."" Section 95, CCP, provides that
everybody (with the exception of the defendant)
who has in his custody objects which may be of
importance as evidence or are subject to confisca-
tion is under the obligation to produce and sur-
render them by request, but that the action which
is provided by law for the enforcement of such
obligation shall not be taken against persons who
have the privilege of silence. The question is
whether any objects which were obtained through
the illegal use of force against a person thus privi-
leged can be used in evidence. An explicit regula-
tion to this effect is missing in the German law.
Whether a ban on the use can be derived from the
fact that the banning provision of Section 95,
CCP, is in close connection with the provisions of
Sections 52, 53, and 55, CCP, 3 should be answered
in' the affirmative. 4 Section 97 provides that
written communications between the defendant
and certain persons who are under the privilege
of silence, or written material which is in the
possession of such privileged persons, is not sub-
ject to impounding, unless these persons are
suspected of being parties in the crime, accessories
after the fact, or receivers. In the event that such
documents are impounded contrary to the ban
of Section 97, CCP, it is commonly held" that
0 1 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Straf-
sachen 135 (Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court in
Criminal Matters).
"K1LEINKNECHT-MULLER, op. cit. supra note 3, at
§81c, n.5b.
12 5 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Straf-
sachen 133 (Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court in
Criminal Matters).
13 See text accompanying notes 4, 5, and 6 supra.
14 Assenting, EBERHARD SCHMIDT, Op. Cit. supra note
3, at §95, n.10; dissenting, KLEINKNECHT-MiULLER, Op.
cit. supra note 3, at §94, preliminary note 7b.
15 KLEINKNECHT-M"LLER, op. cit. supra note 3, at
§94, preliminary note 7d; EBERHARD SCHMDT, op. Cit.
supra note, 3 at §97, n.9.
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they shall not be used in evidence, because they
represent a kind of written memory of the privi-
leged person and hence are barred from any use,
exactly as would be his oral evidence pursuant
to Section 252 in conjunction with the relevant
provision of the CCP regarding the privilege of
silence.
(4) Section 96, CCP, reads:
"The submission or surrender of file-records
or other documents in official custody by authori-
ties or civil servants shall not be demanded if
their supreme office declares that the divulge-
ment of the contents of such files or documents
would be detrimental to the weal of the Federal
Republic or a German Land."
Whether this provision contains a prohibition
against the use of evidence becomes acute in a
case where such documents are submitted to the
judge in spite of the above declaration of the
supreme office, or where the supreme office makes
out the declaration only subsequent to the receipt
by the judge of the files and records. The prevailing
opinion of the courts,' 6 and the better legal theory,
17
is that in such case the judge is denied the use of
the documents, although Section 96 does not
provide for such consequence expressis verbis.
It would appear intolerable that the judge by
using such documents would contribute to the
harming of the weal of the Federal Republic or
a German Land.
The above prohibitions mainly exclude the use
of evidence obtained in violation of statutory
provisions, and this in principle both in favor and
to the detriment of the accused.1 An appeal on
law lies in the event of their violation.
Another question is whether the above prohibi-
tions cease to be effective if he whose protection
the law has in view (mostly the defendant or a
witness) gives his consent to the use of such evi-
dence. Doubtless the answer is no, if the law
forbids the use notwithstanding the consent of the
protected person. This applies for instance to
Section 136a, paragraph (iii), CCP, with regard
to a statement of the defendant which came about
through the application of immoral means. The
question whether, in the absence of an explicit
rule, the use is admissible with the consent of the
Is 72 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Straf-
sachen 271 (Decisions of the Reichsgericht in Criminal
Matters).
17 KLEINKNE HT-MiULLER, op. cit. supra note 3, at
§96, nn.4b & c, and §94, preliminary note 7c.
is See KLEIu-NECHT-MifLER, op. cit. supra note 3,
at §48, preliminary note 2b.
protected person should as a rule be answered in
the affirmative. Hence, for example, there should
be no objection to the use of the statement of a
witness who made it without being advised under
Section 52(ii), CCP, on his privilege of silence, if
he, on being advised subsequently, consents to
the use of his former statement.
Some law theorists0 hold that the statutory
prohibitions against the use of evidence do not
oppose its use in cases where such use will benefit
predominant, legitimate interests. This opinion
cannot be favored, because it has no sufficient
foundation in the statute and might result in a
dangerous undermining of the statutory prohi-
bitions.
ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE THE USE
OF WHICH IS PERMITTED
In two decisions 0 the Reichsgericht held unre-
strictedly, without adducing reasons for its view,
that the ban on a seizure in violation of the CCP
excludes the use in evidence of the illegally seized
object. Today the courts no longer adhere to this
view, which is patently the application of the
general principle that the use of each and every
item of illegally seized evidence is prohibited.
Rather it is the opinion of the Federal Supreme
Curt-the pertinent decision was rendered on
November 13th, 19522--and the apparently gener-
ally accepted opinion of the law teachers" that
evidence which in itself is admissible may in
principle be used although it was obtained in
violation of legal provisions.
According to this opinion illegally obtained
evidence may be used-in default of a legal provi-
sion to the contrary-in the following examples
(which could be increased at choice):
(a) A weapon which contained the finger-prints
of the defendant had been impounded by the
police. The impounding proved to be faulty
because the police officer effecting it was not a
member of the Criminal Police and therefore not
authorized to impound.
29 Id. at §48, preliminary note 2h III.
20 20 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Straf-
sachen 92 (Decisions of the Reichsgericht in Criminal
Matters); 47 id. 196.
1 Not published, but quoted in MoNATsscmur FOR
DEuTscHEs REcHT (German Law Monthly) 148 (1953).
"KLEINKNECHT-MUILLER, op. cit. supra note 3, at
§48, preliminary note 2c; EBERHAPD SCHMIDT, op. Cit.
supra note 3, at §94, n.14; NESE, DOPPELFuN T O-




(b) An impbrtant exhibit, impounded by a
Criminal Police officer as the result of a search,
was produced before the court. The search was
defective, because in the absence of imminent
danger prevailing it should have been made only
by order of the judge.u
(c) The weapon which the defendant had
allegedly used in committing a murder had been
seized during a search effected during the night-
time, in violation of Section 104, CCP. 5
(d) The bodily examination of a witness had
been effected upon orders received by the police,
in spite of the fact that contrary to Section 81c,
CCP, the examination had failed to serve the
purpose of ascertaining a certain trail or a conse-
quence of the criminal act, the examination could
not be expected to be tolerated, detrimental effects
on the health of the witness had been envisaged
or taken place, or the police--in bad or good
faith-had erroneously taken the view that immi-
nent danger was prevailing. 6
(e) A suspect had justly been preliminarily
arrested, but contrary to Section 128, CCP, and
Article 104(iii), Basic Law.n had not been brought
before the judge during the day following his
preliminary arrest. He made a confession before
the police on the second day following his arrest.
This confession may be used unless the interroga-
tion took place in violation of Section 136a, para-
graphs (i) and (ii), CCP.
Although, as mentioned, the use of illegally
obtained evidence is in principle admissible in the
absence of a statutory ban, yet there is an exception
to the rule which has been ably elaborated by the
notable CCP commentators Kleinknecht-Milller:u
"The statutory provisions governing proce-
dure are based on a balance of the public interest
in the enforcement of the State's prosecuting
claims and the public interest in ensuring that
the State's measures which appear necessary to
accomplish this objective encroach only to a
tolerable extent upon the individual. The numer-
ous reservations as regards the admissibility of
24 See CCP, §105(i).
25 For the wording of this section, see Clemens, Police
Detention and Arrest Privileges (Germany), 51 J. CRim.
L., C. & P.S. 421, n.12 (1960).
2
8 KLENxNECnT-MULLER, op. cit. supra note 3, at
§81c, n.7, justly holds that in these cases the result of
the examination may be used.
27 For the wording of these provisions, see Clemens,
Police Interrogation Prinleges and Limitaions (Ger-
many), 52 J. CriM. L., C. & P.S. 59, nn. 2 & 3 (1961).
28 See KLEL1,KNECHT-MiULLER, op. cit. supra note 3,
at §94, preliminary note 7.
public constraint are the result of such com-
promise between either interest. No Code of
Procedure will be able, though, to cram this
counterbalance into rules fitting the thousand-
fold phenomena of life. While as a guarantee
for the necessary continuity some rigor must be
endured, yet in an individual case the rigor can
reach such unbearable dimensions that a devia-
tion from the statutory law appears adequate.
This tacit general clause of the law justifies the
judge to found the inadmissibility of the evidence
upon a heavy procedural infringement, even
though such consequence is not expresdy laid
down by the law. The judge in arriving at his
decision will consider the public interest in the
prosecution. An irreparable procedural blunder
which might be ignored in the interest of the
public claim to a prosecution for murder, can in
petty larceny cases ensue the inadmissibility of
the evidence."
The legal basis of the right of the judge thus estab-
lished to refrain in a single case from using evidenc
the use of which is not prohibited by the statute
and therefore permitted in principle is to be found
in Section 261, CCP, quoted at the beginning of
this report.
EVALUATioN
In accordance with most constitutions of the
western civilized countries, the Basic Law for the
German Federal Republic, dated May 23, 1949,
establishes certain basic rights. To these belong in
particular the inviolability of human dignity
(Article 1), the right to free personal develop-
ment, the right to life and bodily integrity, and
further the inviolability of the freedom of the
person (Articles 2 and 104), the inviolability of the
abode (Article 13), and the safeguarding of prop-
erty (Article 14). These rights, however, are
subject to certain restrictions; otherwise public
order could not be maintained. The Basic Law
pays regard to that by providing, for instance, in
Article 2 that infringements upon the right to
life and bodily integrity and upon the inviolability
of the freedom of a person can be made only on the
basis of a statute. Further, Article 13 provides that.
searches can in principle be ordered only by the
judge and can be effected only in the forms pre-
scribed by statute. And Article 14 says that the
limits of property are drawn only by statute.
Such legal restrictions of the basic rights are
to be found in the CCP in great number: the
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blood-test confines the right to bodily integrity,
the duty of a witness to appear before the court
and to make a statement infringes upon his liberty,
the search of an abode violates its inviolability,
the confiscation of an object entrenches upon
property, etc. The CCP makes these infringements
with as much consideration as is possible by
providing, for instance, that certain witnesses
shall be advised of their privilege of silence, that
the taking of a blood-test can be effected only
by a doctor, that the order for especially serious
-encroachments is reserved to the judge, that
normally the search of an abode during the hours
of night is prohibited, and that the detention by
the police of a preliminarily arrested suspect is
temporary. Infractions of these commands and
prohibitions will as a rule also constitute infractions
of a basic right, because the Basic Law prescribes
that an encroachment upon a basic right shall be
allowed only on the basis of a statute, and there-
fore only with due regard to the precautions con-
tained therein. Such infractions could, of course,
easily be counteracted, in that the statute could
prohibit the use of all evidence obtained in viola-
tion of constitutionally protected basic rights.
The German law has not laid down such rule,
obviously because this was deemed incompatible
with the "principle of the exploration of the truth
which for the sake of the public weal demands the
investigation, prosecution and just punishment
of crimes through the use of all evidence
available.""
On behalf of this principle the German law has
rather refrained from a general ban on the use of
such evidence as was obtained in violation of
basic rights. The CCP has laid down bans on the
use of evidence only in respect of such evidence as
was obtained in violation of human dignity or of
the privilege of silence in its broadest meaning,
and where the use would result in detriments to
the weal of the Federal Republic or a German
Land. By doing this, the law indicates that it gives
priority to these rights and interests alone over
the principle of the free exploration of the truth.
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing observations, the three
questions posed for discussion in connection with
this topic3 can be answered as follows:
" 2 Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofs in Straf-
sachen 105 (Decisions of the Federal Supreme Court in
Criminal Matters).
3 The three questions are set forth in the introduction
to this symposium.
(1 & 2) A statutory ban on the use, in criminal
proceedings, of evidence obtained in violation of
basic rights could aim at (a) the "punishment"
of the individual responsible for such violation, (b)
the protection of the basic rights, or (c) the protec-
tion of the suspect.
The "punishment" of the responsible indi-
vidual-usually an official--cannot be achieved
with the help of such ban, because the ban would
have no consequences to his disadvantage. The
disadvantages would be on the side of the state
or the public alone; because the ban would place
restrictions on the evidence available for the ex-
ploration of the truth and thus hamper or defeat
the revenge on crimes which is in the state or
public interest.
An effective punishment of the responsible
person can be achieved only by holding him respon-
sible under the Criminal Code,3' by suing him for
damages under the Civil Code, or by taking
disciplinary action against him under the appro-
priate disciplinary statutes."
Doubtless, the ban in question affords a far-
reaching protection of the basic rights. But in
view of its hampering effect on the exploration
of the truth, the question remains if this protection
is proper and worth being advocated in every
case of violation of basic rights. An injury to
human dignity-the interrogation of the suspect
or a witness in violation of Section 136a para-
graphs (i) and (ii), CCP-will by all means be
worthy of protection, particularly since a state-
ment thus effected fails to have the slightest
evidential value in trial anyway. On the other
hand, if only a small violation of basic rights
occurs-a search was ordered by a police officer
contrary to Section 105, CCP, although there was
no imminent danger prevailing-the protection
of the basic rights will have to make way for the
higher-valued interest in the exploration of the
truth.
Whether the protection of the suspect calls for
a statutory ban on the use of evidence obtained in
violation of basic rights should be considered from
a similar angle. Certainly, he has in principle the
31 In the case of an official, §341, Criminal Code,
comes into question, which penalizes the official who
wilfully and without being entitled to do so effects, or
causes or allows to be effected, an arrest or a preliminary
apprehension and detention; also applicable is §343,
which penalizes an official who during an investigation
uses or causes or allows to be used means of coercion to
extort confessions or statements.
= This is possible under German Law.
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right of seeing the proceedings against him per-
formed lawfully. But this right will have to stand
back if only a negligible violation of a basic right
has occurred.
(3) As was mentioned above, the use of evidence
obtained in violation of basic rights is not gener-
ally prohibited under German law. Rather, the
law has decided on a compromise. It lays a ban
on the use of such evidence only in the few cases
where it deems the violation of basic rights or
state interests to be an especially serious one;
in all other cases it permits the use of illegally or
even unconstitutionally obtained evidence, only
reserving to the judge a dissenting ruling in the
scope of his free evaluation of evidence.
Naturally, it is open to argument whether the
German law has drawn a just border-line between
admissible and inadmissible evidence. In principle,
the regulation of the law appears satisfactory and
convincing. Technically, however, it is not satis-
factory. It would be desirable that in all cases
where the CCP wants to prohibit the use of illegally
obtained evidence, such prohibitions were enunci-
ated expressis verbis and just as dearly as was done
in Section 136a, paragraph (iii). And it would
further be desirable that the law said with all
distinction that in the absence of an explicit ban
any evidence obtained inviolation of statutory
provisions may be used unless the judge rules
otherwise under Section 261, CCP. This would
considerably decrease the differences of opinion
in the interpretation of the law.
E. Israel
HAIM H. COHN*
The rule prevailing in Israel is the common law
rule that, for the purpose of deciding whether
certain evidence is or is not admissible, the court
will not enquire into the methods by which that
evidence was obtained.1 The only exception to the
rule is that the court will enquire into the circum-
stances under which a confession was made, so as
to ascertain whether it was made freely and
voluntarily.
It is submitted that both the rule and the excep-
tion stand in need of revision.
The sound principle underlying the rule is that
direct evidence which is relevant to the issue and
not privileged from disclosure should be available
to the trier of fact; the sanction for any criminal
offence and the remedy for any civil wrong which
may have been committed in obtaining that evi-
dence are matters not for the law of evidence, but
for the criminal law or the law of torts, as the
case may be. Cases are known in which persons
have been restrained by injunction from producing
evidence wrongfully obtained'; such an injunction
is, of course, a remedy in tort, and implies no
ruling one way or the other on the evidential issue.
Justice, Supreme Court of Israel. Additional bio-
graphical data may be found in 51 J. CRIM. L., C. &
P.S. 175 (1960).-EDrTOR.
'8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §2183 (3d ed. 1940).
2 E.g., Ashtu rton v. Pape, [1913] 2 Ch. 469 (C.A.).
In defence of the exclusion of illegally obtained
evidenge,"it might-apart from purely ethical
grotffnds-be argued that there is another instance
in which the law of evidence is made subservient
to extraneous considerations of public policy,
name.--the privilege attaching to state secrets.
In the one case the public interest is to discourage
ille practices on the part of the police and other
evidence-collecting agencies; in the other case
the public interest is to encourage and safeguard
the proper and efficient administration of govern-
ment. But the common law privilege in favour of
state secrets has remained in full force and vigour
only in England, and even there it time and again
arouses vehement public and professional reac-
tions. It has never, in its absolute form, been part
of the law of Scotland, nor is it recognized as an
absolute privilege by "what some commentators
regard as the better decisions in the United
States."'3 The Supreme Court of Israel, following
Scots, Canadian, and the "better" American
precedents, has recently laid down that there is no
absolute privilege from the disclosure of state
secrets in Israel, but that the trial judge has to
satisfy himself, each time such privilege is claimed,
that the harm which is likely to be caused to the




state by the production of the evidence outweighs
the public interest in a full disclosure to the court
of all evidentiary material relevant to the issue.4
It thus appears that where the common law
has provided an exclusionary rule of evidence in
the public interest and for reasons of public policy,
the modem tendency is to divest that rule of
general and unrestricted application, and to vest
in the trial judge a discretion as to whether or not,
and to what extent, to apply the rule in the par-
ticular case before him. And there seems to be no
valid reason why the development which has
marked the exclusionary rule in respect of state
secrets should not be brought to bear, mutatis
mutandis, on an exclusionary rule in respect of
illegally seized evidence. In both cases, there is a
conflict of public interests and that conflict cannot
justly and equitably be solved by an inflexible
rule of general application, but rather should be
solved in each individual case according to the
best judgment of the trial judge.
These considerations apply no less to the rule
that an illegally seized evidence is admissible than
to the rule that all such evidence is inadmissible.
There might well be instances in which it would
be unconscionable to allow a party to establish
his claim by unlawful means. Actions in equity,
for instance, have always been defeated where the
claimant has come to court with "unclean hands,"
and in any civil or criminal case there may be
circumstances which require or justify the exclu-
sion of illegally obtained evidence which, in other
circumstances, might be held admissible in the
interest of justice or in the general public interest.
Moreover, while it might in many cases be
eminently just and legitimate to penalize a person
for illegally seizing evidence by excluding that
evidence in a suit to which he himself is a party
or in the outcome of which he is beneficially
interested, it is not by any means just or legitimate
to penalize the state for the illegal seizure of
evidence by one of its officers. That officer is not
a party to the suit, nor has he normally any per-
sonal interest in its outcome. The exclusion of such
evidence amounts to a penalization of the general
public for the wrong of one individual--surely a
violation of fundamental principles. While it may
be maintained that a sanction should cause a
wrongdoer to suffer, it can hardly be maintained
that a sanction should not only fail to affect the
wrongdoer, but also permit a different wrongdoer
4 Haetzni v. Ben Gurion, 11 Piskei Din 403 (1947).
to escape punishment for a totally unrelated
transgression.
The Israeli Draft Code of Evidence' provides
that the court may refuse to admit in evidence
any document (including any form of record of
anything said, written, printed, or photographed)
which the party producing it has stolen or obtained
by any other illegal means, or in making or circulat-
ing which the party producing it committed a
criminal offence. 6 A provision to this effect enables
the trial judge, in his discretion, to exclude illegally
seized evidence, where such evidence is sought to
be produced by a party to the litigation before
him; it does not enable him in a criminal case to
exclude evidence obtained by the illegal act of some
police officer who is, of course, a stranger to the
action (unless it is a private prosecution for an
offence by which the private prosecutor himself
was personally injured7).
It is submitted that there is no difference in
principle between a confession wrongfully extorted
and other evidence illegally seized; the misconduct
of the police is as reprehensible in wrongfully
extorting the one as in illegally seizing the other.
With regard to confessions, the law as it stands is
that, however wrongful the manner in which they
were obtained, they are admissible in evidence if
(notwithstanding the manner of their extortion)
they were in fact free and voluntary; the reason is
that if they were free and voluntary, they may be
taken to be true. The ratio excludmdi, then, is not
that they were wrongfully obtained, but that they
may be false. This ratio cannot apply to evidence
the contents of which is normally unaffected by
the manner in which it was obtained, and as to
which such attributes as free and voluntary can
have no meaning. If the reprehensibility of police
misconduct in wrongfully extorting a confession
does not, of itself, warrant the exclusion of the
confession, there is no valid reason why the repre-
hensibility of police misconduct in illegally seizing
other evidence should, of itself, warrant the exclu-
sion of that evidence.
From the point of view of the law of evidence,
exclusionary rules appear to be justified only
where the evidence sought to be adduced is either
6 DRAFT CODE: OF EvDFNcE (1952) (English trans-
lation by Harvard Law School-Israel Cooperative
Research, 1953).
6 Id., §75.
7 Private prosecutions are permissible in Israel for
assault, defamation, trespass, and the violation of trade-
marks and copyrights. MAGISTRATES' COURT JuRis-
DICTION (AxzNDu r) Acr 5714-1954.
HIARUO ABE2
irrelevant or inherently unreliable. (The various
recognized privileges from disclosure do not really
affect the admissibility of the privileged evidence
and are, therefore, not to be classified as exclusion-
ary rules.) Where available evidence is both rele-
vant and manifestly true, the requirement of
justice that it should be produced and admitted
is paramount, and no desire to penalize any indi-
vidual wrongdoer should be allowed to stand in
the way.
The same result is reached when the problem
is looked at from the point of view of practical
efficiency. In the United States where the exclu-
sionary rule in respect of illegally seized evidence
has for many years and by many courts been
rigorously applied, abuses by the police always
were and still are notoriously widespread; the
best experts have expressed doubts whether these
exclusionary rules even tend to remedy the abuses.8
The fact is, the exclusion of such evidence has
failed so far, both in the United States and else-
where, to deter the police from resorting to illegal
means to procure evidence. Maybe the reason
for this deprecable state of affairs lies in the knowl-
edge of police officers that the only sanction likely
to follow upon the illegal procuration of evidence
is its exclusion and rejection, a sanction which may
lead to acquittal of the accused, but which does
not entail any punishment of the police officer.
There may be police forces in which an officer
using illegal means to procure evidence is dis-
ciplined; there may be others in which such an
officer is looked upon with approval and gratitude,
having spared no effort and shown no qualms in
executing his assignment. In the former, instances
of illegal seizure of evidence will be rare; in the
latter, they will be frequent. But in neither does
8 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE, comment to rule 505,
at 243.
it matter much whether the illegally seized evi-
dence is eventually admitted or excluded.
The use by police, of illegal means to procure
evidence is not, however, a matter which may be
left to the domestic disciplinary jurisdiction of the
police force itself. It directly and vitally affects
not only the fundamental (or constitutional)
liberties of the citizen but also the administration
of justice by the courts. It is an eminently criminal
matter, calling for criminal sanctions to be ad-
ministered in as effective and deterrent a manner
as is compatible with the rule of law.
The Israeli legislature now has before it a bill 9
which provides that where a court is satisfied that
a confession sought to be produced in evidence
was unlawfully obtained-whether or not it was
admitted in evidence-the court may commit the
person who has so obtained it to trial in the com-
petent court, or, with his consent, may try him
summarily then and there for the offence he has
committed in extorting the confession.10 Where a
committal order is made to another court, the
finding of the committing court that the confession
was unlawfully extorted is Prima face evidence
against the extorter in the other court.
The same provision can and should be made in
respect of any illegally seized evidence other than
confessions. Such procedural provisions coupled
with substantial increases in the punishment for
criminal trespass and other abuses of office when
committed by a police officer, should be all that is
needed, and at any rate appears to be all that is
possible, to curb illegal practices on the part of the
police. Exclusionary rules in the law of evidence
are neither useful nor justified.
I Law of Evidence Revision (Privileged Evidence)
Bill 5718-1958.
10 The offence is punishable with three years' impris-




THE TRADITIONAL VIEW been answered in the affirmative for many
Should illegally seized evidence be admissible year.
to convict an accused? In Japan this question has Back in 1899 the Supreme Court of Japan held,
* The author gratefully acknowledges the encourage- who has been kind enough to refine the English and give
ment and advice of Professors Fred E. Inbau and him valuable advice on linguistic matters.
Claude R. Sowle in preparing this article for publica- t Public Prosecutor, Ministry of Justice, Tokyo.
tion. The author wants to express his appreciation to Additional biographical data may be found in 51 J.
Miss Ruth E. McKee of the American Embassy, Tokyo, CRIm. L., C. & P.S. 178 (1960).-EDIToR.
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in a case under the Code of Criminal Procedure of
1890, that the defendant's pocket notebook,
illegally seized by a policeman, was lawfully
received in evidence.1 In 1949 the Supreme Court
held, in a case under the Code of Criminal Proce-
dure of 1922, that it was lawful for the trial court
to convict the accused by receiving a piece of
physical evidence which had been seized with
illegal procedure. In this case the Court amplified
the justifications for the traditional rule concerning
the admissibility of illegally seized evidence. It
clarified among others the following two points:
(1) The illegality of search and seizure procedure
does not change the nature, condition, or shape,
and therefore the evidential value, of the thing
which has been illegally seized; (2) The problem
concerning the admissibility of a statement ob-
tained by illegal interrogation procedure should be
distinguished from the problem of the admissibility
of illegally seized evidence; in the former the
illegality of the procedure may affect the substan-
tive probative value of the statement, whereas in
the latter the illegality of the procedure has noth-
ing to do with the evidential value of the thing
seized.
PRESENT LAW AND PRACTICE
Under the new Code of Criminal Procedure of
1948 there have been no Supreme Court decisions
precisely on point, but there are some high court
decisions which follow the traditional rule.
3
Majority opinion among judges and realistic-
minded lawyers appears to favor the traditional
position as established by judicial precedents.4
The most important arguments supporting the
traditional rule are those pointed out by the
Supreme Court decision of December 13, 1949.5
Beside those, however, the following two reasons
have been maintained by the followers of the
traditional rule: (1) It would be useless to deny
admission to illegally seized evidence, because the
prosecution may easily evade the strict rule by
repeating the seizure in compliance with law:
(2) It would be better to remedy the unfairness
1VoL 5, No. 1. Sup. Ct. Crim. Rep. 38 (1899).
1Decision of the Supreme Court (3rd Petty Bench,
D.ec. 31, 1949) (unpublished).
3 E.g., Supp. No. 16 High Courts Crim. Rep. 41 (To-
kyo High Court 1950), holding an illegally seized re-
ceipt admissible.
4 E.g., TE Suzu.me COURT, SECRETARIAT GENERAL,
SIMMARY RECORD OF =xz NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF
CRIMINAL JUDGES ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (Materials
on Criminal Justice, No. 66) 110 (1952) (in Japanese).
$See note 2, supra.
of an illegal seizure of evidence by punishing the
officer who made the illegal seizure or by giving
the accused some recourse such as the right to
compensation by the state.
PROGRESSIVE VIEWS
Most scholars and progressive lawyers, in-
fluenced or encouraged by such American expe-
rience as the development of the "federal exclu-
sionary rule," 7 have expressed various views
counter to the traditional.8
The grounds for their contentions are not exactly
the same, but their views are unanimous on the
point that it will be impossible to stop police
practices of collecting evidence with filthy hands
without squashing the very object (i.e., the con-
viction of the accused) toward which the over-
zealous police are desperately struggling.9 The
threat of punishment is not effective enough to
intimidate a police officer who attempts to be a
"hero" by sacrificing himself for illegally seized
6E.g., Dando, Comments, 3 COLLECTED CRIMINAL
CASE CommENTs 150 (1943) (in Japanese); Koke, Ad-
missibility of Illegally Obtained Evidence, 2 KEmo
ZASSal (J. of Crim. Law) (No. 3) 71 (1951) (in Jap-
anese); Hirano, Criminal Procedure, in LAw LEcTURE
SERsIS 119 (4th ed. 1956) (in Japanese); Hirano, Con-
trol of Investigation by Exclusion of Evidence, 7 KEiIO
ZAssut (J. of Crim. Law) (Nos. 2,3, and 4, consolidated)
243 (1957) (in Japanese); HIRABA, LECTURE ON CRIM-
INAL LAW 177, 178 (1955) (in Japanese); Adachi. Seiz-
ure, Search, and Inspection, in 2 COURSE Ox LEGAL
PRACiiCE 342-44 (1953) (in Japanese); YOKOGAWA, A
STUDY ON CRIMINAL TRIAL 163 (1953) (in Japanese);
Saito, Relations Between the Illegality in Procedure of
Obtaining Evidence and the Admissibility of Evidence, 6
Hoso Juio (Lawyers Ass'n J.) (No. 9) 1 (1954) (in
Japanese).
7 E.g., see articles by Hirano, Koke, and Seito, cited
in note 6, supra.
S Some maintain that illegally seized evidence should
be simply inadmissible; some contend that illegally
seized evidence should be inadmissible unless illegality
is due to minor technical errors; some contend that il-
legally seized evidence should be inadmissible if the
illegality constitutes a crime.
9See Hirano, op. cit. supra note 6, at 247: "If the
cause of such illegal activities are eagerness or desire to
succeed in official business one may squash these objec-
tives in preventing the illegal activities. Obstructing the
conviction of the accused by excluding evidence will be
the most effective remedy for over-zealous investigating
officers; criminal penalty will only invite their dissatis-
faction and resistance. On the contrary, if the causes of
such illegal activities are feelings of superiority, arro-
gance, or indifference toward citizens, exclusion of evi-
dence will not be very effective; direct discipline by
punishment will be more effective.
"Which is the greater cause? This will not be simply
decided. However, at least it may be said that there is a
considerable tendency toward lawlessness owing to ex-
cessive eagerness; and it can be foreseen that this tend-
ency will be growing in the future."
HARUO ABE
evidence.10 It has been suggested that it is not
the voluntary will of each individual officer but
the blind will of the whole police organization




Fairness and quick detection are two essential
components of criminal justice. The harmonization
of these competing values has been and will be
the eternal objective of law. It is remarkable that
thousands of years ago the ingenious inventors of
Chinese characters already perceived this func-
tional structure of criminal justice and succeeded
in symbolizing it in an archaic style of the Chinese
ideograph signifying "law" or "justice.'
13
In the latter part of the twentieth century we
are still suffering from the age-old problem of
achieving quick and strict justice together with
fair and humanitarian justice. Unquestionably
the maxim "in dubio pro reo" has been an effective
amulet to protect human rights of the suspect
10 In the Sugo case (a case of "agent provocateur";
not guilty, the Oita District Court, Aug. 4, 1958; guilty
but excused from punishment, the Fukuoka High
Court, Sept. 12, 1959), a police officer was found guilty
but excused from punishment for having supplied a
radical group with dynamite for blasting a police box;
but later he obtained a good position in a publishing
company having connection with the police organiza-
tion. It seems to be the general feeling among the police
that a wounded "hero" must be warmly taken care of.
11 Hirano, op. cit. supra note 6, at 247.
12 This conclusion is purported to be a conclusive
statement not only for the present article but also for
my other articles published in this series. See 51 J.
CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 178 (1960); 51 id. 429 (1960); and
52 id. 67 (1961).
C3 f. HsU SHEN (2nd Century, A.D.), Snuo WEN CHMH
rzu 4352 (Ku lin edition, I-hsiien shu-chi, Shanghai,
1928). Etymologically the rather complicated symbol
consists of two parts. The left hand component means
water, which in ancient times symbolized the even-
handed justice. The right hand component, which again
can be broken down into an upper part and a lower part,
signifies an imaginary animal resembling a unicorn
which was supposed to have the supernatural power of
tossing the guilty party to one side, out of the forum-a
mystic living lie-detector! Our oriental ancestors who
invented this ingenious device for symbolizing the pro-
found abstract concepts seem to have perceived the two
essential functions of criminal justice, i.e., (a) quick and
accurate identification of the guilty from the innocent
and (b) fair and even treatment of the people. For the
ancient ideograph for "Law" see the cover of CRimiNAL
JUSTICE IN JAPAN (Ministry of Justice, Tokyo, 1957,
2d ed. 1960).
and accused from uncivilized practice on the part
of criminal investigators. So long as instances
remain of uncivilized police practices, 14 any device
that safeguards human rights against abusive
investigating authority is worthy of retention.
On the other hand, it should not be overlooked
that emphasis on the rights of suspects has led
some judges to discharge suspicious defendants in
difficult cases, particularly when there has been
no confession to corroborate circumstantial evi-
dence.
5
It is my belief that the way of bridging the gap
between idealism and realism is not to be found in
elaborating the existing system into one of logical
complexity or exquisite technicality, but in re-
constructing the system practicably, giving con-
sideration to human weakness as well as to human
wisdom. The first step will be the establishment of
a criminal justice with less reliance on confession
or admission and more on the development of
scientific investigation. The efforts to attain this
objective should be accompanied by the painful
activity of educating and enlightening both the
general public and criminal investigators. It should
be bome in mind that only by way of this thorny
path can we hope to solve those difficult problems
centered around the privilege against self-in-
crimination, the law of arrest and interrogation,
the law of confession, and the rule relating to ille-
gally seized evidence.
14 Among the recent cases in which judgments of
"guilty" were reversed by the high courts and the Su-
preme Court for the reason that confessions were un-
lawfully coerced, the following four cases were most
shocking and sensational: the Matsukawa case, the
Futamata case, the Sachiura case and the Yakai case.
In these cases, in which most defendants had been sen-
tenced to death in the district courts, police brutality
was ascertained by the high courts and the Supreme
Court.
5 Among several recent cases of this nature, the
Crowley case was most typical. In this case an American
millionaire allegedly, while intoxicated, killed his
brother-in-law in the Imperial Hotel in Tokyo, and he
was prosecuted for the crime of "inflicting a bodily in-
jury resulting in death" (PENAL CODE, art. 205, par. 1).
The Tokyo District Court acquitted the accused because
of insufficient proof. The records show that there were
many pieces of circumstantial evidence tending to prove
his guilt, but the judges appeared to hesitate to convict
him on circumstantial evidence. In this case the police
did not press a confession, and naturally there was no
confession or admission volunteered by the accused. It
is reported that when the police asked him to be tested







Before we examine the question of excluding
unlawfully acquired evidence, it is well to mention
briefly the rules which apply to the right of the
police to obtain evidence against an accused per-
son.
- The right of the police to search is strictly regu-
lated by the Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act
of 1887. When a person is suspected on reasonable
grounds of a punishable offence for which the
maximum statutory penalty can exceed a fine, the
police may search the person or his dwelling, pro-
vided that there is reason to believe that the search
will lead to his arrest, or to discovery of evidence
of the punishable offence, or to seizure of objects
involved
Search of another party's dwelling can also be
undertaken under certain circumstances, for in-
stance when there is strong reason to believe that
a wanted person, stolen property, or traces of a
punishable act can be found in the dwelling.
2
Whether the above-mentioned conditions are
present or not, the police can institute a search of
a place of business which can be operated only
with police permission or which is available to the
public.3
If the person concerned does not consent to the
search, it can be undertaken only on a court order.
But if the purpose of the search is likely to be
thwarted by the delay involved in awaiting the
court order, the prosecuting authority can issue an
order to proceed with the search. If there is not
even time for this, the search may be undertaken
by the police without an order, provided there is
strong suspicion of an offence for which the
maximum statutory penalty is a term of imprison-
ment longer than six months.
4
A police officer who, by order of the court or
the prosecuting authority, is empowered to arrest
* This paper is mainly an abbreviated form of an
article written by the author on the exclusion of illegally
seized evidence. The article was published in NoRmisic
TIDsKRIUF FOR RETTSVITENSKAP (The Northern Jour-
nal of Law) 109-32 (1959).





an accused person may search the latter's dwelling
without special permission.
5
The Act contains different regulations for the
carrying out of the search. 6
. In practice the accused generally consents to
the search, thus making it unnecessary for the
police to obtain an order from the court or the
prosecuting authority.
The Criminal Procedure Act also contains
regulations on when seizure can take place. The
main provision is that seizure may be made of
objects which can be considered of importance
as evidence, or that ought to be regarded as
confiscable.7
If the person concerned does not consent to
the seizure, a court order must be sought, or if
time does not allow this, an order from the pros-
ecuting authority. If even then the delay would be
too long, the police may act on their own author-
ity.8
If there has been no time to obtain a court order,
the question whether the seizure shall be upheld
must be laid before the court at the earliest possible
opportunity. 9
A person in possession of an object considered
* important as evidence can, if he is obliged to offer
testimony iri the case, be ordered by the court to
produce the object. 0 Those exempt from the
obligation t6 give evidence are chiefly the family
of the accused and persons bound by professional
secrecy to whom the accused has given confidential
information (defending counsel, doctors, ministers,
etc.).11
There are detailed provisions in the act regarding
the method of carrying out seizure and returning
objects seized to the owner, etc.
2
Evidence against an accused person may also
be obtained by interrogation, blood tests, con-
frontation and the like. The question of the extent
to which the police can question the accused,










more thoroughly in earlier articles by the author
in this series. 13
II.
The Norwegian Criminal Procedure Act has no
provision concerning the admissibility of evidence
seized in contravention of the Act. Nor is much
guidance to be found in literature on Norwegian
criminal procedure. The only declaration of prin-
ciples I can find is given by the Norwegian Profes-
sor of Criminal law, Johs. Andenaes, who declares
that if a confession is extracted under conditions
at variance with those required at police ques-
tioning, there is much to be said for excluding the
confession on the principle that the police should
not be allowed to offer evidence acquired in an
illegal manner. But, it is added, it is doubtful if
our courts, generally speaking, would accept such
a principle.
14
So far as I can see the question of the steps that
should be taken with regard to illegally seized
evidence has not been comprehensively dealt with
in any Scandinavian country.
iII.
Before we go further into the question of how
the problem should be solved in Norway, it might
be profitable first to consider the most important
reasons for and against excluding illegally seized
evidence.
In favour of the acceptance of illegally seized
evidence, it may be put forward that the task of
the court is to come to a materially correct deci-
sion, and that all information, apart from that
positively excluded by the law, should therefore
be taken into consideration. There might be un-
happy results, both in respect of the security of
society and general deterrence, if persons who
are blatantly guilty escape punishment simply
because the evidence was obtained in an unlawful
manner. This is especially important in the case
of criminals who might commit grave punishable
offences if not deprived of their liberty. If there is
reason to reproach the police or others on account
of the method in which the evidence was obtained,
liability should he met in the form of punishment
or other measures. If the measures which can now
13 See Bratholm. The Pri'ilege Against Self-ncrimnina-
lion (Norway). 51 J. CRnf. L., C. & P.S. 186 (1960);
Bratholm. Police Interrogation Privileges and Linita-
lions iNorav). 52 id. 72 (1961).
1 ANDENAES, POLITIFMBEDSMENNENES BLAD (The
Journal of Police Officials) 154 (Oslo 1958).
be applied are not considered stringent enough,
stronger remedies should be considered.
Against the admission of illegally seized evi-
dence, the objection can be raised that this would
encourage the use of unjustified methods of investi-
gation. For even if the guilty officer runs the risk
of punishment or other sanctions, it would in
practice be difficult to instire that the sanctions
in fact are applied. It is clear that it is necessary
to have a policeman investigate the case against
another policeman, and this position, taken to-
gether with the circumstance that the illegal act
was committed in the course of the fight against
criminality, might easily lead to weakness in
elucidation of the case and any possible penal
consequences. Only if broad rules are laid down
forbidding the admission of illegally acquired
evidence can one hope to be able to put a stop to
illegalities of this kind.
Another objection against the admission of
illegally acquired evidence is that it could cause
difficulties in respect of the rehabilitation of the
individual offender, and besides it might reduce
the general respect for the law. Experience in-
dicates that criminals are especially sensitive to
encroachment on the part of the authorities and
that the feeling of having been unjustly treated
can have the effect of inducing criminality. These
handicaps will, in the long run, more than counter-
balance the advantage of convicting one or another
criminal as a consequence of the illegal methods.
Besides, it can be claimed that it will be of little
practical significance if an offender now and then
should escape punishment. This is especially the
case today when the suspension of prosecution or
sentence has to wide an application.15 The purpose
of the prosecution often seems to be fulfilled
when the case is cleared up and the offender identi-
fied, and this he generally will be, even if the
evidence against him is excluded with the result
that he escapes a formal sanction.
There seem to be weighty reasons in favour of
both solutions, and this may well indicate that it is
impractical to lay down any definite regulations in
s According to the Norwegian criminal statistics of
1958, about three out of four persons guilty of a felony
(felonies may be generally defined as offenses punishable
by more than three months' imprisonment) got sus-
pended sentence or suspended prosecution. In Norway
the Public Prosecution Authority may suspend prose-
cution though the guilt of the accused appears beyond
doubt. For further information, see Bratholm, Arrest
and Detention in Norway, 1U8 U. PA. L. Rzv. 336, 341,
nn.24, 25, & 26 (1960).
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favour of one solution or the other. As far as I
know, a definite choice between solutions has not
been made in any country, but to a greater or
lesser extent the decision has depended upon the
circumstances in each particular case. In some
countries, however, an attempt has been made to
lay down definite solutions in certain types of
cases; however, it seems to have proved difficult,
even in such limited fields, to follow definite rules,16
in the absence of compulsory legal provisions such
as those in the West-German Criminal' Procedure
-Act of 1950. This includes a provision, Section
136a, which forbids various closely defined methods
of improper questioning. Evidence obtained by use
of the forbidden methods cannot be admitted,
even if the accused himself consents to the ad-
mission. Certainly no other country has such
extensive provisions for the protection of the
accused against illegal methods of questioning.
These rules mustbe seenagainst the background of
experiences gained by the German people under
the National Socialist regime.
IV.
When deciding whether unlawfully acquired
evidence should be excluded, there are a number
of points which may be taken into account.
(1) Attention should first be paid to the gravity
of the unlawful procedure, whether it was wilful
or inadvertent, or whether, perhaps, it was the
result of completely innocent misconception of
competence. In the latter case it does not seem
likely that there would be any reason to exclude
the evidence.
Generally speaking, a course of procedure which
is punishable must be considered more grave than
one to which no penalty is attached, in so far as
criminal legislation gives special protection to
essential interests. But there are important inter-
ests which do not lend themselves to protection
by criminal law, or which have not yet attained
such protection, and therefore decisive weight
should not be laid on whether the course of action
is a crime in law. In Anglo-Saxon law, for example,
evidence has been excluded on the grounds that
the method of obtaining it involved an "unfair
trick" against the accused.17
16 See COWEN & CARVER, EssAYs ON THE LAW OF
EvIDENcE 77 (Oxford 1956); Williams, Evidence Ob-
tained by Illegal Means, CRim. L. REv. (Eng.) 342
(1955); Comment, 49 J. Crim. L., C. & P.S. 59, 63
(1958).
17 COWEN & CARTER, Op. cir. supra note 16, at 88, 102.
Another important point to consider is Whether
material encroachment has taken place or whether
there has only been a breach of the form pre-
scribed by law. There is, for example, an essential
difference between the seizure of evidence when
the law positively forbids it (for example a medical
case history) and the seizure of evidence when the
police have failed to obtain consent of the court in
a case where they could have obtained consent
had they requested it. In the last mentioned case
there is little to be said in favour of excluding the
evidence, since the police have not acquired evi-
dence unobtainable under the strict provisions of
the law.
Generally, unlawful methods of procedure
directed against the person, in the form of com-
pulsion, threats, and the. like, must be considered
more serious than unlawful acts performed in
obtaining material evidence. A method of pro-
cedure is considered especially serious if it involves
a breach of Section 96 of the Norwegian Consti-
tution, which forbids questioning with torture.
(2) It must also be considered important whether
the unlawful action constitutes a direct injury to
the accused or whether it is harmful first and fore-
most to the interests of others. One can, for exam-
ple, imagine that the police have acquired decisive
evidence against the accused by an unlawful
examination of a witness or by an unlawful search
of the house of a third party. In these cases the
accused hardly has a justifiable claim that the
evidence should be excluded, since he had no
control over the object produced in evidence and
therefore should have been prepared for the fact
that the witness or the third party might consent
to the searching. On the other hand, in certain of
these cases the wiltess or the third party must have
the right to oppose the admission of evidence. The
decision probably depends on a weighing on the
one hand of the importance to justice of the ad-
mission of the evidence, and on the other hand of
the extent of injury the admission could cause to
the offended party.
(3) Who obtained the illegal evidence is also a
significant question; it seems, generally speaking,
less harsh to admit evidence unlawfully obtained
by a private person than by the police, since there
is no question of encroachment on the part of the
authorities.
(4) Further, the type of accusation is important.
The more serious the accusation, the more hesi-
tancy must there be in excluding evidence. This
ANDERS BRATHOLM
is especially the case when there is a danger that
the offender will commit more serious crimes if he
is not imprisoned.
(5) The strength of the evidence is also probably
important (if there is a basis for judging its
strength). There will be little hesitancy in rejecting
unlawfully obtained evidence considered to have
little importance to the outcome of the case.
However, in many cases, the fact that evidence
was obtained unlawfully will itself lead to a serious
weakening of its importance; if, for example, a
confession is obtained by force, there is little
.reason to pay attention to it.
(6) Lastly, an important point may arise
concerning when an objection is raised against the
unlawfully acquired evidence. The longer an
accused person or his counsel waits before putting
forward an objection, the weaker must that ob-
jection become, since the public prosecutor may
have omitted to introduce other evidence, relying
on the evidence already before the court. More-
over, difficult problems of procedure will easily
arise if the accused postpones the raising of his
objection, especially if he raises it for the first time
after the evidence has been laid before the trial
court. If evidence is to be excluded in such a case,
either the court must disregard it-no easy matter
when it is already known-or a new trial must be
instituted, with other judges. These practical
difficulties could justify the admission of evidence
that ought to have been excluded had the objec-
tion been raised in time, especially when the
accused is to blame .for failing to object at an
earlier stage.
V.
It may be asked how the points of view given in
the paragraphs above tally with court practice in
Norway in respect of the admission of unlawfully
obtained evidence. In reply it must be noted that
it is difficult to form a reliable picture of this prac-
tice since there are so few published court decisions
in Norway.
The dearth of court decisions could be taken as
indicating that evidence is seldom obtained in
Norway in an unlawful manner, but this would be
a hasty conclusion. In this field one must assume
the existence of a certain number of unknown
instances of illegal seizures of evidence.
First, unlawfully obtained evidence can aid in
clearing up a case without being known to anyone
but the investigator concerned. For example,
the investigator might come upon a trace of the
guilty party's actions by unlawfully opening
letters or tapping telephones. By means of such
information the investigator finds a lead to other
evidence, and neither during the investigation nor
later is it disclosed that the case was cleared up
on the basis of unlawful means.
It must also be assumed that a certain number
of accused persons who have been victims of
unlawful methods of investigation omit to make
a complaint on this point, either because they are
not aware that the method is unlawful, or because
they cannot prove that any unlawful act has been
committed, or-if they can prove such an act-
that there is any causal connection between the
unlawful method of procedure and the evidence.
It is also possible that many accused persons
and counsel in Norway doubt the possibility of
excluding unlawfully obtained evidence. This too
canhelp explain the paucity of cases in practice.
The scarcity of court decisions can also be
attributed to the fact that the public prosecutor is
somewhat reserved in using illegally obtained
evidence, especially if the case turns on a serious
illegality, both because he desires to conceal the
illegality and because he considers it unfair to the
accused to make use of the evidence. It may be
that a fully solved criminal case is shelved where
it would have been tried if the evidence had been
obtained in a regular manner.
VI.
I shall describe some cases of unlawful obtaining
of evidence which have been recorded.
The first case concerned evidence obtained by
means of unlawful arrest and seizure. The case
concerned two Swedish citizens who had unlaw-
fully transported a consignment of coffee from
Norway over the border to Sweden, where they
were arrested by Norwegian customs officials.
They both accepted a fine, but later withdrew their
acceptance and claimed that the decision must be
quashed and the impounded coffee handed over
to them because the arrest and seizure had taken
place unlawfully on Swedish territory.
The judge of the Supreme Court delivering the
court's opinion'8 declared that even if the customs
officials had acted illegally in arresting the accused
on the Swedish side of the border, this could be of
no decisive importance in judging the criminal
nature of their conduct or the validity of their-
" Norsk Retstidende (Nor. Law Rep.) 684 (1918 I).
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acceptance of the fine; the complaint was there-
upon dismissed.
The second case concerned the use of unlawful
methods of questioning. It involved three traitors
who lay in prison in 1945 suspected of various
punishable actions during the war, including the
liquidation of a member of the Norwegian Resist-
ance Movement The accused declared themselves
not guilty of the liquidation. Two constables on
temporary service in the police decided they should
attempt to extract a confession by taking the
- suspects by night to the place where the liquidation
had taken place, under conditions as similar as
possible to those which obtained on the night of
the liquidation. The first man broke down and
confessed before they had reached the spot; the
second was taken there and then confessed;
thereupon the third man admitted his guilt, before
it was necessary to subject him to the same treat-
ment.
The judge of the Supreme Court delivering the
court's opinion"° declared that on the occasion
referred to the police had openly violated a number
of procedural provisions designed for the protection
of the accused, and that their action bore the stamp
of a disrespect for law which was foreign to Nor-
wegian justice and which must not be tolerated.
But the court did not conclude that the confessions
must therefore be excluded. The question of the
admissibility of the evidence was not discussed
clearly, and as far as I can see from the judgment,
it was not clearly maintained by the defence that
the manner in which the evidence was obtained
should cause the court to disregard it completely.
There are some decisions concerning the ad-
missibility of a statement given to the police by
one closely related to the accused, when the wit-
ness was not informed by the police (as is required)
of his right to refuse to make a statement, but
later pleads exemption from court proceedings.
The evidence can be used either by introducing
the police report containing the witness's declara-
tion or by testimony of the police officer concern-
ing what the person questioned told him. Opinions
on the admissibility of such evidence are divided.
There is no solution offered in the law, and con-
sistent precedents are not available. In some cases
evidence is admitted, but in others it is excluded.
VII.
On the basis of the meagre precedent referred
to here, we must conclude that apparently no
11 Norsk Retstidende (Nor. Law Rep.) 46 (1948).
extensive powers exist under Norwegian law to
exclude unlawfully obtained evidence; neverthe-
less, we may not conclude that no such powers
exist, since in the cases where such evidence has
been admitted no especially strong reasons for
excluding it have been present.
little can be said in favour of quashing the
conviction in the coffee smuggling case. The un-
lawful action of the customs officials hardly
seems grave according to the information at hand.
That the accused persons accepted the fine and
waited to object until the time of their appeal
may well have contributed to the result, even
though. the Supreme Court did not deal with this
question.
Nor does the sentence of the Supreme Court
in the case of the traitors seem open to criticism.
The accusation related to the most serious crime
known to criminal law, premeditated murder;
moreover, even if the method of investigation
was highly irregular, it can hardly be described as
grave under the conditions which prevailed just
after the war.
Another important point concerns the practical
difficulties which probably would have arisen
had the court decided to exclude the unlawfully
obtained evidence in this case. It is not positively
stated, but there is a strong probability that the
suspects' confessions and their detailed statements
on the liquidation led to the revelation of other
evidence.
Had the court quashed the conviction because
of the confessions, it would then have had to pass
on the admissibility of the evidence brought to
light as a consequence of the confessions. Much
could be said in favour of excluding this evidence
too, for the police would not have been able to
obtain it if they had proceeded in a strictly lawful
manner.
In practice it is at times difficult to distinguish
between evidence directly obtained by unlawful
methods, and other evidence; it may be asked
how this doubt can be eliminated. Should all
evidence be excluded which is a consequence of
evidence obtained in an unlawful manner, or should
discretion be the keynote of admission? The de-
cision should probably be made along the lines I
have mentioned earlier, that is, on the basis of
such circumstances as the degree of illegality of
the method of procedure, the type of crime, and
so on.
In the case involving the traitors, if the charge
